The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any Generalized Social Welfare Function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a dictatorship, is necessarily nontransitive. In 2002, Kalai asked whether one can obtain the following quantitative version of the theorem: For any ǫ > 0, there exists δ = δ(ǫ) such that if a GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of non-transitive outcome is at most δ, then the GSWF is at most ǫ-far from being a dictatorship or from breaching the Unanimity condition. In 2009, Mossel proved such quantitative version, with δ(ǫ) = exp(−C/ǫ 21 ), and generalized it to GSWFs with k alternatives, for all k ≥ 3.
Introduction
Consider an election procedure in which a society of n members selects a ranking amongst k alternatives. In the voting process, each member of the society gives a ranking of the alternatives (the ranking is a full linear ordering; that is, indifference between alternatives is not allowed). The set of the rankings given by the individual members is called a profile. Given the profile, the ranking of the society is determined according to some function, called a generalized social welfare function (GSWF).
The GSWF is a function F : (S k ) n → {0, 1} ( k 2 ) , where S k is the set of linear orderings on k elements. In other words, given the profile consisting of linear orderings supplied by the voters, the function determines the preference of the society amongst each of the k 2 pairs of alternatives. If the output of F can be represented as a full linear ordering of the k alternatives, then F is called a social welfare function (SWF).
Throughout this paper we consider GSWFs satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition: For any pair of alternatives A and B, the preference of the entire society between A and B depends only on the preference of each individual voter between A and B. This natural condition on GSWFs can be traced back to Condorcet [6] .
The Condorcet's paradox demonstrates that if the number of alternatives is at least three and the GSWF is based on the majority rule amongst every pair of alternatives, then there exist profiles for which the voting procedure cannot yield a full order relation. That is, there exist alternatives A, B, and C, such that the majority of the society prefers A over B, the majority prefers B over C, and the majority prefers C over A. Such situation is called non-transitive outcome of the election.
In his well-known Impossibility theorem [1] , Arrow showed that such paradox occurs for any "reasonable" GSWF satisfying the IIA condition: Theorem 1.1 (Arrow) . Consider a generalized social welfare function F with at least three alternatives. If the following conditions are satisfied:
• The IIA condition,
• Unanimity -if all the members of the society prefer some alternative A over another alternative B, then A is preferred over B in the outcome of F ,
• F is not a dictatorship (that is, the preference of the society is not determined by a single member), then the probability of a non-transitive outcome is positive (i.e., there necessarily exists a profile for which the outcome is non-transitive).
Since the existence of profiles leading to a non-transitive outcome has significant implications on voting procedures, an extensive research has been conducted in order to evaluate the probability of non-transitive outcome for various GSWFs. Most of the results in this area are summarized in [9] . In addition to its significance in Social Choice theory, this area of research leads to interesting questions in probabilistic and extremal combinatorics (see [19] ).
In 2002, Kalai [14] suggested an analytic approach to this study. He showed that for GSWFs on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition, the probability of a non-transitive outcome with respect to a uniform distribution of the individual preferences can be computed by a formula related to the Fourier-Walsh expansion of the GSWF. Using this formula he presented a new proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem under additional assumption of neutrality (i.e., invariance of the GSWF under permutation of the alternatives), and established upper bounds on the probability of non-transitive outcome for specific classes of GSWFs.
While providing an analytic proof to Arrow's theorem does not seem such an important goal (as there are several simple proofs of it, see [10] ), Kalai aimed at establishing a quantitative version of the theorem. Such version would show that for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ = δ(ǫ) such that if a GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of non-transitive outcome is at most δ, then the GSWF is at most ǫ-far from being a dictatorship or from breaching the Unanimity condition. Kalai indeed proved such statement for neutral GSWFs on three alternatives, with δ(ǫ) = C · ǫ for a universal constant C.
Kalai [15] asked whether his techniques can be extended to general GSWFs, and suggested to use the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality [4, 3] in order to get such an extension. However, Keller [17] showed by an example that a direct extension cannot hold -if there exists δ(ǫ) as above, then it cannot depend linearly on ǫ. Keller asked whether for general GSWFs on three alternatives, a quantitative version holds with δ(ǫ) = C · ǫ 2 .
A few months ago Mossel [20] succeeded to prove a quantitative version of Arrow's theorem for general GSWFs on three alternatives. Furthermore, he generalized his result to GSWFs on more than three alternatives, and to more general probability distributions on the individual preferences. Unlike Kalai's techniques, Mossel's proof is quite complex. While Kalai's proof uses only simple analytic tools but no combinatorial tools, Mossel's proof extends and exploits a combinatorial proof of Arrow's theorem given by Barbera [2] . Furthermore, it uses "heavier" analytic tools, including a reverse hypercontractive inequality of Borell [5] and a non-linear invariance principle introduced by Mossel et al. [19] . The only drawback in Mossel's result is the dependence of δ on ǫ: δ(ǫ) = exp(−C/ǫ 21 ) for a universal constant C, which seems far from being optimal. Mossel conjectured that the "correct" dependence of δ on ǫ should be polynomial. 1 In this paper we present a tight quantitative version of Arrow's theorem for general GSWFs. We show that the dependence of δ on ǫ is indeed polynomial, and compute the exact dependence, up to logarithmic factors.
Before we present our results, we should specify the notion of "the distance of a GSWF on k alternatives satisfying the IIA condition from a dictatorship or from breaching the Unanimity condition". We consider two different definitions of this notion. In both definitions, the underlying probability measure is the uniform measure on (S k ) n (the set of all possible profiles).
The first definition measures the distance of the GSWF under examination from the family of GSWFs on k alternatives which satisfy the IIA condition and whose output is always transitive. This family was partially characterized by Wilson [22] , and fully characterized by Mossel [20] . It essentially consists of combinations of dictatorships with constant functions (see Section 2.3 for the exact characterization). Definition 1.2. Denote by F k (n) the family of GSWFs on k alternatives which satisfy the IIA condition and whose output is always transitive. For a GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, let
We note that this is the definition that was used in [20] . Our main result with respect to this definition is the following: Theorem 1.3. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any k and for any GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in F is at most
For the second definition, we note that a GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition actually consists of k 2 independent Boolean functions F ij that represent the choice functions amongst the pairs of alternatives (i, j) (for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k). The second definition is given in terms of these functions. 1 We note that Mossel also obtained another variant of his theorem, in which the dependence of δ on ǫ is δ(ǫ) = Cǫ 3 n −3 , where n is the number of voters, and C is a "decent" constant. As follows from our results presented below, this variant is essentially tight for very small values of ǫ (dependent on n). Moreover, for certain choices of parameters (specifically, "relatively small" n and ǫ very small as a function of n), this result gives a stronger bound than our result, due to the better value of the constant. Definition 1.4. Denote by G 2 (n) the set of constant functions and dictatorships on two alternatives. For a GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, let
where {F ij } 1≤i<j≤k are as defined above.
Our main result with respect to this definition is the following: Theorem 1.5. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any k and for any GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in F is at most
Note that for small values of ǫ, the exponent of ǫ in (1) tends to 9/8.
We show that the dependence of δ on ǫ in Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 is tight, up to logarithmic factors in ǫ. The examples showing the tightness are GSWFs on three alternatives, in which all the three choice functions F 12 , F 23 , and F 13 are monotone threshold functions. In the example of Theorem 1.3, the expectations of the choice functions are 0, 1 − ǫ, 1 − ǫ (in particular, one of the functions is constant!), and in the example of Theorem 1.5, the expectations are ǫ, 1/2, 1−ǫ.
As in the works of Kalai and Mossel, the techniques we use are mainly analytic. Our proof essentially consists of three steps:
1. We consider a GSWF F on three alternatives, and use a modification of Kalai's formula to express the probability of non-transitive outcome as a linear combination of "noise correlations" between the Boolean functions F 12 , F 23 , and F 13 (see Section 2.2 for the definition of noise correlation).
2. We show that if at least one of the functions F 12 , F 23 , and F 13 is close enough to a constant function, then the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality [4, 3] and a reverse hypercontractive inequality due to Borell [5] can be applied to obtain simultaneously upper bounds and lower bounds on the noise correlations. Combination of these bounds yields a lower bound on the probability of non-transitive outcome in terms of
3. To complete the proof, we use the techniques of Mossel to "cover" all the remaining cases (i.e., functions with D 1 (F ) or D 2 (F ) greater than a fixed constant, etc.)
We note that since in the case where
is greater than a fixed constant we use Mossel's result as a black box, the value of the constant we obtain in the dependence of δ(ǫ) on ǫ is extremely low, and seems to be very far from optimality. Extension of our techniques to cover all the cases would make the proof free of non-linear invariance arguments, and lead to a "decent" value of the constant. This is one of the main open problems left in our paper. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the tools used in the later sections. In Section 3 we prove our main lemma. We deduce Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 from the main lemma in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the tightness of our results. We conclude the paper with questions for further research in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section we present the tools used in the next sections. First we describe the FourierWalsh expansion of functions on the discrete cube. We continue with the noise operator and the hypercontractive inequalities of Bonami-Beckner and of Borell. Finally, we cite the statements from Mossel's proof of the quantitative Arrow theorem [20] that are used as a black box in our proof.
Fourier-Walsh Expansion of Functions on the Discrete Cube
Throughout the paper we consider the discrete cube Ω = {0, 1} n , endowed with the uniform measure µ. Elements of Ω are represented either by binary vectors of length n, or by subsets of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Denote the set of all real-valued functions on Ω by X. The inner product of functions f, g ∈ X is defined as usual as
The Rademacher functions {r i } n i=1 , defined as r i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 2x i − 1, constitute an orthonormal system in X. Moreover, this system can be completed to an orthonormal basis in X by defining r S = i∈S r i , for all S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Every function f ∈ X can be represented by its Fourier expansion with respect to the system {r S } S⊂{1,...,n} :
This representation is called the Fourier-Walsh expansion of f . The coefficients in this expansion are denoted byf (S) = f, r S .
The Fourier-Walsh expansion allows to adapt tools from classical harmonic analysis to the discrete setting, and to use them in the study of Boolean functions. Since the introduction of such analytic methods in the landmark paper of Kahn, Kalai, and Linial [13] in 1988, they were intensively studied, and led to applications in numerous fields, including combinatorics, theoretical computer science, social choice theory, mathematical physics, etc. (see, e.g., the survey [16] ).
The most basic analytic tool we use is the Parseval identity, asserting that for all f, g ∈ X, f, g = S⊂{1,...,n}f (S)ĝ(S), and in particular, S⊂{1,...,n}f (S) 2 = ||f || 2 2 , for any f ∈ X. The next simple tool we use is the close relation between the Fourier-Walsh expansions of a function and of the respective dual function. 
The simple proof of the claim is omitted. We use also a variant of the dual function:
Similarly to Claim 2.2, it is easy to see that for any |S| ≥ 1,
In Kalai's proof of the quantitative Arrow theorem for neutral GSWFs [14] , only the most basic analytic tools (like the Parseval identity) were used. Following the proof of Mossel [20] , we use also more advanced analytic tools, related to the noise operator presented below.
The Noise Operator and Hypercontractive Inequalities
The noise operator, defined in [3, 4] , is a convolution operator that represents the application of the function on a slightly perturbed input.
, is a distribution obtained from x by independently keeping each coordinate of x unchanged with probability 1 − ǫ, and replacing it by a random value with probability ǫ.
It is easy to see that the noise operator has a convenient representation in terms of the FourierWalsh expansion:
Claim 2.5. Consider a function f on the discrete cube with a Fourier-Walsh expansion f = Sf (S)r S . The Fourier-Walsh expansion of T ǫ f is given by:
Since T ǫ f represents the application of f on a noisy variant of the input, it makes sense to define the ǫ-noise correlation of two functions f and g as T ǫ f, g . Using the Parseval identity, we get an equivalent definition in terms of the Fourier-Walsh expansion (note that the definition is symmetric between f and g):
Definition 2.6. Given two functions f, g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, the ǫ-noise correlation of f, g is
In the proof of Lemma 3.2, we express the probability of non-transitive outcome in a GSWF F on three alternatives in terms of the noise correlations between the Boolean choice functions F 12 , F 23 , and F 13 . Then we obtain upper and lower bounds on the noise correlations using the hypercontractive inequalities presented below.
The first hypercontractive inequality we use is the Bonami-Beckner inequality, discovered independently by Bonami [4] in 1970 and by Beckner [3] in 1975.
Theorem 2.7 (Bonami,Beckner). Let f : {0, 1} n → R, and let q 1 ≥ q 2 ≥ 1. Then
In particular,
This inequality was first applied in a combinatorial context in [13] , and since then it was used in numerous papers in the field. We combine the Bonami-Beckner inequality with the CauchySchwarz inequality to obtain an upper bound on the ǫ-noise correlation of Boolean functions. The upper bound is presented here for ǫ = 1/3 since this is the case we use in the proof of Lemma 3.2, but it can be immediately generalized to any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
Proof: By Claim 2.5, the Parseval identity, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the BonamiBeckner hypercontractive inequality, we get:
Similarly,
This completes the proof.
The second hypercontractive inequality we use is a reverse hypercontractive inequality, due to Borell [5] . This inequality asserts that under some conditions, a variant of the Bonami-Beckner inequality holds in the inverse direction.
Theorem 2.9 (Borell). Let f : {0, 1} n → R + , and let q 1 ≤ q 2 ≤ 1. Then
. Although Borell's result dates back to 1982, it wasn't used in the research of Boolean functions until recent years. In the last few years, Borell's inequality was used in several papers [7, 18, 20] ; it seems to be a useful tool that has yet to be fully developed.
We use Borell's inequality to obtain a lower bound on the ǫ-noise correlation of Boolean functions through the following corollary, presented in ( [18] , Corollary 3.5):
In the proof of Lemma 3.2, we apply Theorem 2.10 with α ≥ 1, and write the lower bound in the form p 1 · p β 2 . We use a simple observation regarding properties of β =
Observation 2.11.
• As a function of α = log p 1 (p 2 ), β is monotone decreasing.
• For all α ≥ 1, we have β ≤ 
where α = log 2 (1/p). For a small value of p, the exponent tends to 9/8.
Mossel's Quantitative Arrow Theorem
In the proofs of Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 we use (as a "black box") three major components of Mossel's proof of his quantitative version of Arrow's theorem [20] . The first is a quantitative Arrow theorem for GSWFs on three alternatives: 
We use this theorem only in the case where ǫ is bigger than some fixed constant. Thus, the "bad" dependence of δ on ǫ affects our final result only by a constant factor.
The second component is a generic reduction lemma that allows to leverage results from GSWFs on three alternatives to GSWFs on k alternatives, for all k ≥ 3. The reduction can be formulated as follows: 
The third component is a complete characterization of the set F k (n) of GSWFs on k alternatives that satisfy the IIA condition and whose output is always transitive. Though we use in our proof only the characterization of F 3 (n), the result is presented here for a general k for the sake of completeness. • For any profile, F ranks all the alternatives in A i above all the alternatives in A j , for all i < j.
• For all s such that |A s | ≥ 3, the restriction of F to the alternatives in A s is a dictatorship (i.e., is equal either to the preference order of some voter j or to the reverse of such order).
• For all s such that |A s | = 2, the restriction of F to the alternatives in A s is an arbitrary non-constant function of the individual preferences between the two alternatives in A s .
Proof of the Main Lemma
In this section we prove our main lemma, asserting that if F is a GSWF on three alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, and at least one of the Boolean choice functions F 12 , F 23 , and F 31 is "close enough" to a constant function, then the probability of non-transitive outcome can be bounded from below in terms of D 1 (F ) and D 2 (F ). Throughout this section we use the following notations: 
For each i, we denote p i = min(p i , 1 − p i ), and let 
where D 1 (F ) is as defined in the introduction and RHC(·, ·) is as defined in Notation 2.12.
Proof: Our starting point is Kalai's formula [14] for the probability of non-transitive outcome in a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition:
The proof is divided into several cases, and in each case we use a different modification of Formula (9). In the following, we assume w.l.o.g. that p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ p 3 . Moreover, we assume w.l.o.g. that p 1 ≤ 1/2, since otherwise we can replace f, g, h by the dual functions without changing the value of the right hand side of (9).
3.1 Case 1:
First, we note that if p 3 ≤ 1/2, then the assertion follows easily from Kalai's Formula (9). Indeed, since by assumption we have p 1 < 2 −500000 , it follows that (1
(1−2 −500000 ). On the other hand, by the Parseval identity and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have |
and similarly,
Thus, by Formula (9),
Therefore, we can assume that p 3 ≥ 1/2. Note that in this case, we have
Indeed, define a GSWF G on three alternatives by the choice functions:
It is clear that G ∈ F 3 (n), since G always ranks alternative 1 at the bottom and thus its output is always transitive, and
We modify Formula (9) using the following identities:
All three identities follow immediately from basic properties of the dual function (e.g., Equations (2) and (3)) and the Parseval identity. Substituting Equations (12), (13), and (14) into Formula (9), we get:
Equation (15) expresses P (F ) as a linear combination of "noise correlations" between the functions f, g, h, which are obviously nonnegative. Thus, if we obtain a lower bound on the noise correlations that appear in Equation (15) with a '+' sign, and an upper bound on the correlation that appears with a '-' sign, we will get a lower bound on P (f ). We shall obtain these bounds using the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality and Borell's reverse hypercontractive inequality. We subdivide our case into two sub-cases.
3.1.1 Case 1a: 1 − p 3 < 1/32.
We bound T 1/3 f ′ , 1 − h from above using the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality. By Proposition 2.8, we get:
We bound T 1/3ḡ , 1 − h from below using Borell's reverse hypercontractive inequality. By Theorem 2.10, we have
In order to estimate RHC(1 − p 2 , 1 − p 3 ), we write it in the form (1 − p 2 ) · (1 − p 3 ) β(α) , where α = log 1−p 2 (1 − p 3 ). By Observation 2.11, β(α) is a monotone decreasing function of α. Since by assumption, 1 − p 2 > 31/32 and 1 − p 3 < 1/32, we have α ≥ log 31/32 (1/32) = 109.16.
Substituting the value α = 109.16 into the definition of β(α) and using the monotonicity of β(α), we get β ≤ 1.198, and thus,
Combining Inequalities (16) and (17), we get
Finally, substituting into Equation (15) we get:
where the last inequality holds since 1 − p 2 ≥ 1/2 ≥ 1 − p 3 ≥ p 1 and since RHC(·, ·) is clearly non-decreasing in its arguments. The assertion of the lemma follows now from Inequalities (10) and (11).
Case 1b:
As in the previous case, we bound T 1/3 f ′ , 1 − h from above using the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality. By Proposition 2.8, we get:
where the last inequality follows since by assumption p 1 ≤ 2 −500000 , and in particular, p 1 ≤ (1 − p 3 ) 4 . In order to bound T 1/3ḡ , 1 − h from below we use the reverse hypercontractive inequality. By Theorem 2.10, we have
As in the previous case, we write
Since by Observation 2.11, for any α ≥ 1, we have β(α) ≤ 1+ǫ 1−ǫ = 2, we get
Combination of Equations (20) and (21) yields
where the last inequality follows since 1 − p 3 ≤ 1/2. Finally,
as asserted. This completes the proof of Case 1.
Case 2:
In this case, we have
since defining a GSWF G ′ on three alternatives by the choice functions:
we get G ′ ∈ F 3 (n), and D(F, G ′ ) ≤ 2(1 − p 2 ). Also, it is clear that like in Case 1,
This time we use a slightly different modification of Kalai's formula. Specifically, we interchange the roles of g and h in Equations (12), (13), and (14), and get the following modification of Equation (15):
We subdivide this case into several sub-cases.
Case 2a:
By Proposition 2.8, we get:
On the other hand, by Theorem 2.10, we have
Since p 1 ≤ 1 − p 2 and either p 3 or 1 − p 3 is not less than 1/2, we get
where the last inequality follows from Observation 2.11 since p 1 ≤ 2 −500000 . Combining Inequalities (26) and (27) we get 001 1 )(0.5p
Finally,
where the last inequality holds since 1 − p 3 ≥ 1 − p 2 . The assertion of the lemma follows now from Inequalities (23) and (24).
Case 2b:
The upper bound in this case is the same as in Case 2a:
For the lower bound, we use the reverse hypercontractive inequality for the term T 1/3 (1−g),h , and get
where the second inequality follows from Observation 2.11, and the third inequality follows from the assumptionp 3 ≥ p 0.2002
1
. Combination of Inequality (29) with Inequality (30) yields:
where the second to last inequality follows from the assumption 1 − p 2 ≥ p 0.45412
, and the last inequality follows since p 1 ≤ 2 −500000 . Finally, if p 3 ≥ 1/2 then T 1/3 f ′ , h ≥ RHC(1/2, p 1 ), and otherwise, T 1/3 (1 − g),h ≥ RHC(1/2, p 1 ). In both cases,
and the assertion follows. In this case we use another modification of Kalai's formula (9) , resulting from the following modification of Equation (25):
By Proposition 2.8,
Hence,
where the last inequality follows since
Finally, by Equation (32),
as asserted.
Case 2d:
We use yet another modification of Equation (25):
Similarly to Case 2c, we have
and T 1/3 f ′ , 1 − g ≤ p 1.4 1 , and thus,
Proof of Theorem 1.3
Theorem 4.1. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any GSWF F on three alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in F is at most δ(ǫ) = min(C, 1 50000
Proof: It is clearly sufficient to prove that for any ǫ > 0, if
, for a universal constant C. We shall prove this for
where C ′ is the constant in Mossel's Theorem 2.13.
Let F be a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA conditions, and denote the choice functions of F by f, g, and h, as in the proof of Lemma 3.2. If D 1 (F ) ≥ 2 −500003 , then by Theorem 2.13, P (F ) ≥ C. Thus, we may assume that 
, and similarly for g. This implies that
, and thus we can apply Lemma 3.2 to F and get
as asserted. Thus, we may assume that G is a dictatorship.
The following part of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.1 in [20] . W.l.o.g., we assume that the output of G is determined by the first voter. We "split" the choice functions according to the first voter. Let
and similarly for g and h. Furthermore, for any profile (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ S n 3 , denote
and similarly for G. The Boolean choice functions of F σ are f a 1 , g a 2 , and h a 3 , where (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) ∈ {0, 1} 3 represents the preference σ of the first voter (note that only six of the eight possible combinations of (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) represent elements of S 3 ). Denote byf a 1 ,ḡ a 2 ,h a 3 the choice functions of G σ . Since G is a dictatorship of the first voter, the functionsf a 1 ,ḡ a 2 , andh a 3 are constant. Clearly, we have
and thus, for all σ ∈ S 3 ,
and since G σ is constant, this implies that
and similarly for g a 2 and h a 3 .
The rest of the proof is divided into two cases:
• Case B: There exists σ 0 ∈ S 3 such that
We first show that Case A leads to a contradiction by constructing a GSWF
Then we show that in Case B, the assertion of the theorem follows by applying Lemma 3.2 to the function F σ 0 .
Case A: Consider a GSWF G ′ whose choice functions f ′′ , g ′′ , and h ′′ are defined as follows: For a 1 ∈ {0, 1},
and similarly for g ′ and h ′ . We claim that the output of G ′ is always transitive, and thus G ′ ∈ F 3 (n). Indeed, by assumption, for any σ ∈ S 3 , there existsḠ σ ∈ F 3 (n − 1) such that
The GSWFḠ σ cannot be a dictatorship since by Equation (38), the choice functions f a 1 , g a 2 , and h a 3 of F σ satisfy
and thus, for any dictatorship H,
Therefore,Ḡ σ always ranks one alternative at the top/bottom. Denote the choice functions of G σ byf ,g, andh, and assume w.l.o.g. thatḠ σ always ranks alternative 1 at the top, and thus f = 1 andh = 0. Since
Hence, by the definition of G ′ , its choice functions satisfy f ′′ = 1 and h ′′ = 0, which means that G ′ always ranks alternative 1 at the top, and is thus always transitive.
Therefore, G ′ ∈ F 3 (n), and on the other hand, we have
contradicting the definition of D 1 (F ).
. By Equation (38), the choice functions
and thus (in the notation of Lemma 3.2), D ′ 2 (F σ 0 ) ≤ 6D 1 (F ) < 2 −500000 . Hence, we can apply Lemma 3.2 to the GSWF G σ 0 , and get
This completes the proof of the theorem. Theorem 1.3 follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 using Theorem 2.14 (the generic reduction lemma of Mossel).
Proof of Theorem 1.5
Theorem 4.2. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any GSWF F on three alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in F is at most
Proof: By Equation (8), it is sufficient to prove that for any ǫ > 0, if D 2 (F ) = ǫ, then
for a universal constant C. We shall prove this for
where C ′ is the constant in Mossel's Theorem 2.13. Let F be a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA conditions, and denote the choice functions of F by f, g, and h, as in the proof of Lemma 3.2.
First we consider the case D 2 (F ) ≥ 2 −500003 . We show that in general,
and thus in this case we have D 1 (F ) ≥ D 2 (F ) ≥ 2 −500003 , which by Theorem 2.13 implies
, and denote the Boolean choice functions of G by f ′ , g ′ , and h ′ . Clearly,
By Theorem 2.15, G either always ranks one alternative at the top/bottom or is a dictatorship. In the first case, at least two of the functions f ′ , g ′ , and h ′ are constant, and thus Equation (41) implies that at least two of the functions f, g, and h are at most D 1 (F )-far from a constant function. In the latter case, the functions f ′ , g ′ , and h ′ are dictatorships, and thus Equation (41) implies that f, g, and h are at most D 1 (F )-far from a dictatorship. Hence, in both cases,
Now we consider the case D 2 (F ) < 2 −500003 . Assume w.l.o.g. that the minimal distance min G∈G 2 (n) Pr[F ij = G] is obtained by the choice function f , and letf ∈ G 2 (n) satisfy Pr
Iff is a constant function, then in the notations of Lemma 3.2, this implies that
as asserted. Thus, we may assume thatf is a dictatorship.
Assume w.l.o.g. thatf is a dictatorship of the first voter. Define the functions F σ , f 0 , f 1 , g 0 , g 1 , h 0 , and h 1 as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, and let
Clearly, we have
and thus, for a 1 ∈ {0, 1},
Sincef 0 andf 1 are constant functions, this implies that
• Case B: 
Consider the GSWF F σ 0 for the preference σ 0 = (1, 1, 0) . Since h 0 is at least 7D 2 (F )/4-far from the constant zero function, it follows that
and thus,
. Hence, we can apply Lemma 3.2 to the GSWF G σ 0 , and get
This completes the proof of the theorem.
The generalization to k alternatives for all k ≥ 3 follows immediately by applying Theorem 4.2 to any subset of three alternatives.
Tightness of Results
In this section we show that for GSWFs on three alternatives, the assertions of Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 are tight up to logarithmic factors. In all our examples below, the Boolean choice functions f, g, h of the GSWF F are monotone threshold functions, that is, functions of the form:
for different values of l. We note that in ( [19] , Theorem 2.9), Mossel et al. showed that amongst neutral GSWFs on three alternatives, a GSWF based on the majority rule is the "most rational" in the asymptotic sense (i.e., has the least probability of non-transitive outcome as the number of voters tends to infinity). To some extent, our examples generalize this result to general GSWFs on three alternatives. The examples show that GSWFs based on monotone threshold Boolean choice functions are "close to be the most rational" amongst GSWFs whose choice functions have the same expectations, in the sense that their probability of non-transitive outcome is logarithmic close to the lower bound. In fact, we conjecture that such GSWFs are indeed the most rational amongst GSWFs whose choice functions have the same expectations. However, such exact result is not known even for neutral GSWFs.
We use the following proposition of Mossel et al. [18] , showing that Borell's reverse BonamiBeckner inequality is essentially tight for diametrically opposed Hamming balls. Since we use the proposition only for noise of rate ǫ = 1/3, we state it in this particular case.
Theorem 5.1 ( [18] , Proposition 3.9). Fix s, t > 0, and let f n , g n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be defined by
In order to show the tightness of Theorem 1.3, we fix a constant ǫ > 0 and define the choice functions according to Equation (44), choosing the values of l such that
It is clear that D 1 (F ) = ǫ. By Equation (25),
By our construction, the pair of functions (1 − g,h) is of the form considered in Theorem 5.1, with s = t ≈ 2 log(1/ǫ), and thus by the theorem, for n sufficiently large,
The lower bound asserted by Theorem 1.3 is P (F ) ≥ C ′ · ǫ 3 , and thus the example shows the tightness of the assertion up to logarithmic factors.
The tightness of Theorem 1.5 is shown similarly, with choice functions chosen such that
It is clear that D 2 (F ) = ǫ, and by Equation (25),
The pairs (f ′ , h) and (1 − g,h) are both of the form considered in Theorem 5.1, and application of the theorem to both of them yields tightness up to a logarithmic factor, like in the previous case.
Finally, we note that while the examples above deal with GSWFs whose choice functions have constant expectation, it also makes sense to consider choice functions whose expectation tends to zero, as n (the number of voters) tends to infinity. In particular, one may ask what is the least possible probability of non-transitive outcome, as function of n, for GSWFs with D 1 (F ) > 0 or D 2 (F ) > 0. It appears that the question is of interest mainly for D 2 (F ), as for D 1 (F ), one can easily check that the minimal possible probability of 6 −n is obtained by a GSWF whose choice functions are chosen according to Equation (44), such that
For D 2 (F ), it was shown in [17] that for a GSWF whose choice functions are chosen according to Equation (44), such that
we have P (F ) ≤ 0.471 n . Furthermore, it was conjectured that this is the most rational GSWF on three alternatives that satisfies the assumptions of Arrow's theorem (and in particular, the minimal possible probability 6 −n is not obtained). Our results show that this function is at least "close" to be the most rational, as by Theorem 1.5, for any GSWF F such that D 2 (F ) > 0, we have P (F ) ≥ C · RHC(1/2, 2 −n ) ≈ C · 0.458 n .
Questions for Further Research
We conclude this paper with several open problems related to our results.
• Our main lemma (Lemma 3.2) gives an essentially tight lower bound on the probability of non-transitive outcome for GSWFs in which at least one of the Boolean choice functions is "close" to a constant function. In the case where the distance from constant functions is greater than a fixed constant, our technique fails, and we use Mossel's theorem [20] instead. As a result, the constant multiplicative factor in the assertions of Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 is extremely small, and clearly non-optimal. It will be interesting to find a "direct" proof also for GSWFs whose Boolean choice functions are "far" from constant functions, thus removing the reliance of the proof on the non-linear invariance principle (used in Mossel's argument) that seems "unnatural" in our context, and improving the constant factor.
• While the results of Kalai [14] and Mossel [20] hold also for more general distributions of the individual preferences called "even product distributions" or "symmetric distributions" (see [17, 20] ), our proof does not extend directly to such distributions. The reason is that for highly biased distributions of the preferences, the lower bound obtained by Borell's reverse Bonami-Beckner inequality is weaker, and cannot "beat" the upper bound obtained by the Bonami-Beckner inequality. Thus, obtaining a tight quantitative version of Arrow's theorem for general even product distributions of the preferences is an interesting open problem.
• We believe that GSWFs whose Boolean choice functions are monotone threshold functions are the most rational amongst GSWFs whose choice functions have the same expectations, not only in the asymptotic sense, but also for any particular (large enough) n. However, this conjecture seems quite challenging, as it includes the Majority is Stablest conjecture (whose proof by Mossel et al. [19] holds only in the limit as n → ∞).
• Another direction of research is using our techniques to obtain quantitative versions of other theorems in social choice theory. In [8] , Friedgut et al. presented a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [11, 21] for neutral GSWFs on three alternatives. Recently, Isaksson et al. [12] generalized the result of [8] to neutral GSWFs on k alternatives, for all k ≥ 4. One of the main ingredients in the proof of [8] is Kalai's quantitative Arrow theorem for neutral GSWFs. It seems interesting to find out whether our quantitative version of Arrow's theorem can lead to a quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for general GSWFs (without the neutrality assumption).
• Finally, our results (as well as the previous results of Kalai [14] and Mossel [20] ) apply only to GSWFs that satisfy the IIA condition, since such GSWFs can be represented by their Boolean choice functions, which allows to use the tools of discrete harmonic analysis. It will be very interesting to find a quantitative version of Arrow's theorem that will not assume the IIA condition, but rather will relate the probability of non-transitive outcome to the distance of the GSWF from satisfying IIA.
